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"The question is whether or not these companies were being manipulated by the guys who invest to drain them of their money, leaving behind people who were unemployed," Gingrich said. "Show me somebody who has consistently made money while losing money for workers and I'll show you someone who has undermined capitalism. That's an indefensible model." -Guardian (2012) quoting Newt Gingrich.
Introduction
Every morning an increasing number of employees across the world nd themselves working in a rm targeted for a buyout. Buyouts are undertaken by private equity rms who buy, improve, and resell mature rms using capital invested in private equity funds. During the period 1985 to 2006, private equity rms bought corporate assets in the US at an average yearly value of approximately 1% of the total US stock market value, with a top value of 3% in 2006 (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009 ).
But the spread of the buyout business model has not escaped criticism. In the wake of the nancial crisis in Europe, labor unions have claimed that buyouts, through layos and wage cuts, generate returns to investors at the expense of employees.
1 The question whether private equity rms are job creators or job destroyers has also stirred an intense media debate in the US, as one of the candidates for the 2012 Republican Party presidential nomination, Mitt Romney, is a former private equity executive. Our opening quote from Newt Gingrich, another candidate commenting on deals undertaken by Mr Romney's team, gives a good example of commonly heard views on buyouts.
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In light of the costs of unemployment, to employees and society, claims of systematic layos should be taken seriously.
3 Recent academic evidence on the employment eects of buyouts in the US suggest modest declines in rms employment growth, but indicate internal reorganization with employment growth declines in old establishments oset by the creation of new establishments (Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, Lerner, and Miranda, 2011). 4 Evidence from the UK also suggest declines in rm level employment growth, but the eect appears to be weaker for more recent buyouts than for buyouts in the 80s (Wright, Thompson, and Robbie, 1992; Amess and Wright, 2007; Amess, Girma, and Wright, 2008) . Things look dierent in France, where buyouts provide capital to credit constrained rms and thereby spur rm level employment growth (Boucly, Sraer, and Thesmar, 2011) . These studies are important for enhancing our understanding on how buyouts aect employment. Yet data limitations have prevented 1 See, for example, FSA (2008) ; ITUC (2007) ; PSE (2007). 2 For more on the debate, see for example The Economist, Jan 28th 2012, "Monsters, Inc?"; The Economist, Jan 28th 2012, "Bain or blessing?"; Financial Times, Jan 10th 2012,"Video attacks Romney's record"; Financial Times, Jan 13th 2012, "The bane of Bain"; or The Wall Street Journal, Jan 9th 2012, "Romney at Bain: Big Gains, Some Busts".
3 Evidence suggests that unemployment can lead to, among other things, wage cuts after accepting a new job oer, a consumption reduction and loss of income as well as a general decline in happiness. See, e.g., Farber (2005) , Katz and Mayer (1990) , Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) , Gruber (1997) and Di Tella, MacCullock, and Oswald (2001). 4 Declines in rm level employment growth rates are consistent with other papers utilizing data for shorter time spans (Kaplan, 1989; Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1990; Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1990). them from pinning down a central question in the heated debate: what happens to individual employees? The question cannot be fully answered using data at the establishment or rm level.
Take the observed declines in employment growth as an example. These could be due to layos (hurting employees) or to natural attrition and reductions in hirings (not aecting employees).
Given the growth of the buyout industry, the extensive media coverage, and the global political consequences of the debate, evidence on how individual employees are aected is of general interest.
In this paper, besides performing analyzes of employment growth at the rm and establishment level, we go beyond previous studies by evaluating the eects on individual employees' unemployment risk and labor income. We base our analysis on 201 buyouts undertaken between 1998 and 2004 in Sweden. Sweden has an active private equity market (with close to 50% of all buyouts undertaken by foreign private equity rms), and rich linked employee-employee data is available. Additionally, access to population data allows the construction of a control group of employees not aected by a buyout using detailed demographic data.
We present three novel ndings.
1. The yearly unemployment risk is reduced by 1.1 percentage points or 12.7% on average for four years after the buyout. Yearly labor income increases by 3734 SEK or 1.4% on average over the same period. The labor income increase is not driven entirely by the lower unemployment risk in itself and occurs across most quartiles of the labor income distribution.
2. The eect on rm and establishment level employment growth are similar to eects observed in the US and the UK, but not those observed in France. The cumulative four year dierence in employment growth rate between treated and control establishments is -6.0 percentage points in Sweden compared to -5.4 percentage points reported for the US in Davis et al. (2011) . The point estimate for the average establishment employment growth rate in the four years following a buyout is -1.2 percentage points. The decline in establishment employment growth rate is driven by reduced hirings rather than by increased layos. In line with previous evidence from Sweden in Bergström, Grubb, and Jonsson (2007) , we nd no statistically signicant eects on rm level employment growth.
3. A plausible explanation for the reduction in unemployment risk is that the buyout improves access to capital for nancially constrained rms. The reduction in unemployment risk is mostly concentrated to industries dependent on external capital to grow, non-divisional buyouts in which the target rm is more likely to be nancially constrained, and buyouts undertaken just prior to the economic slowdown following the IT stock market crash in 2001. Labor market regulations do not seem to restrict private equity rms from ring employees. On the contrary, employees with softer protection are more likely to benet from a buyout.
These ndings are based on a dierence-in-dierence estimator identifying the eects from variation between a treated group and a control group of employees over time. The central assumption behind the dierence-in-dierence estimator is parallel trending in the absence of treatment.
Then, the trend in the outcome of the control group serves as the counterfactual outcome and the estimated eect can be interpreted as causal. To ensure parallel trends, a good control group is essential. We match treated employees with similar employees not aected by a buyout using detailed information on current and historic observable characteristics such as sex, age, skill level, income, unemployment incidence, geographical location and rm/establishment characteristics. To address any remaining concerns of potential selection on unobservables, we perform two robustness checks. We estimate a staggered treatment model using employees in rms who have been or will be aected by a buyout as controls and, construct an alternative control group of employees who are aected by strategic acquisitions. Overall, the sign and the statistical signicance of the average estimated eect remains constant indicating that the estimates in our main specication can be interpreted as causal.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the employment eects of buyouts by going beyond existing rm and establishment level studies to focus on the eects on individual employees.
Moreover since most benets to employees occur when nancial constraints are important, our paper also oers a contribution to the more general literature on nance and labor which has not yet studied how nancial constraints aect individual employees' unemployment risk.
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The next section presents a theoretical background and Section 3 discusses our data and identication strategy. Our main results are presented in Section 4 and we discuss interpretations of our results in Section 5. Additional analysis and robustness checks are available in an online appendix.
2 Theoretical Background
In a foundational paper on the role of buyouts, Jensen (1989) argues that a private equity rm or leveraged buyout association is an organizational form superior to the public corporation because it is designed to reduce agency problems between dispersed owners and the manager of the rm. Dispersed ownership allows managers to avoid hard and unpopular tasks such as ring employees and reducing wages. Without careful monitoring and the right incentives, managers can engage in empire building by hiring too many employees, acquiring too many companies, or diversifying activities too much. A buyout could reduce these problems since private equity rms concentrate ownership, implement pay-for-performance schemes, and increase leverage (Leslie and Oyer, 2009) . But an increase in leverage is also accompanied with an increase in bankruptcy risk (Andrade and Kaplan, 1998; Strömberg, Hotchkiss, and Smith, 2011) , and slimming the organization to get rid of slack could involve layos and a reduction in wages.
Indeed, a motivation for hostile takeovers could be to capture value from employees through breach of implicit contracts between managers and employees (Shleifer and Summers, 1988) .
As Lazear (1979) points out, moral hazard can make it optimal to pay employees a lower wage than the value of their marginal productivity early in their careers and a wage higher than the value of their marginal productivity later in their careers. If writing an explicit contract is not possible, employees and managers can implicitly agree on wages increasing with tenure. Such 5 For more aggregated empirical studies on the connection between nancial constraints and labor markets see, for example, Caggese and Cuñat (2008) , Matsa (2010) , Benmelech, Bergman, and Seru (2011) or Pagano and Pica (2012) and the references therein.
6 See http://www.ifn.se/joacimt agreements can be broken after an ownership change. If wages are hard to reduce, due to labor market regulations or collective agreements, dismissing employees with longer tenure being paid a wage higher than the value of their marginal productivity is optimal. Thus, cost cutting, a high debt load, and breach of implicit contracts can lead to increased unemployment risk.
But there are also reasons to why buyouts can benet employees. As several authors have pointed out, private equity rms are, today, more oriented towards operational improvements and helping rms grow than cost cutting.
7 Boucly et al. (2011) argue that buyouts can be a substitute for other sources of capital and thereby accelerate rm level employment growth if rms are nancially constrained prior to the buyout. There are several reasons to expect a buyout to relax nancial constraints at the rm level. For example, private equity rms have connections and experience in dealing with banks; they are good at monitoring the rms so banks are more willing to lend; and they are more likely to reinvest earnings rather than pay out dividends because of tax reasons and a focus on the exit. If better access to capital makes the rm more resilient to negative protability chocks and allows new investments to be undertaken, buyouts can lead to decreased unemployment risk.
It remains an empirical question whether the negative eects on employees from cost cutting and a higher debt load outweighs the positive eects of relaxed nancial constraints.
Data and Identication

Sample construction
To study if the negative eects on employees from cost cutting and a higher debt load outweighs the positive eects of relaxed nancial constraints we create a comprehensive data set on buyouts and employees. We use two sources of information on buyouts: the Capital IQ database and buyouts identied in Bergström et al. (2007) 
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To this list we add buyouts identied in Bergström et al. (2007) that Capital IQ did not record (39 transactions) providing us with a sample of 322 buyouts.
10
7 See, for example, Boucly et al. (2011) or Kaplan and Strömberg (2009). 8 Capital IQ denes a leveraged buyout as follows: This feature is assigned when a nancial sponsor acquires a mature business by combining equity with debt, raised by leveraging the business. This is only applicable:
[i)]To strategic buyer transactions when it is explicitly mentioned in the press release. [ii)]To transactions where a majority stake is being acquired (i.e. 50% or more). "
9 Capital IQ denes a transaction as closed when the transaction has been closed, but no hard information is available on whether it is eective. An eective transaction is a transaction that has been closed and where Capital IQ has found information that it is also eective. In practice, all closed transactions should be eective unless the transaction is recent.
10 Bergström et al. (2007) describe their sample of buyouts as follows: Our sample contains all private equity sponsored exits with a deal value of over $5 million exited in the period 1998 to the rst half of 2006. The sample is further limited to deals where at least one of the private equity sponsors in the investor syndicate We use the IFN Corporate Database containing information on names and the registration number for all rms in Sweden to add the rm registration number to each buyout.
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Capital IQ only gives us the name of the target rm, we manually match names from Capital IQ to names and rm registration numbers in the IFN Corporate Database. After this procedure, we are left with 255 buyouts with rm registration numbers. The most likely reason for why we fail to nd registration numbers is that the rm has changed its name or that it is not registered as a Swedish limited liability corporation.
Correcting for the group structure of limited liability corporations in Sweden allows us to keep track of majority ownership of rms by other rms. For example, a buyout can take place in a rm that is a holding company with majority ownership in several other rms (who in turn can own other rms). If we do not correct for the group structure, the buyout would show up as aecting zero employees since all employees are registered as working in rms owned by the holding company.
We use the IFN Corporate Database to obtain information on the ownership structure of rms in Sweden (information is available for [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . We take the date the buyout was announced and apply last year's ownership structure to the buyout if the ownership structure was reported before the rst of November and this year's ownership structure if the buyout was reported after the rst of November. We use the rst of November as the basis for our merge because the employer-employee link is made for the rst of November each year and because we want to ensure that employees are not treated before the buyout is announced. We then mark rms as being part of a buyout if they were directly or indirectly majority owned by the targeted rm. If there are two buyouts in the same rm registration number in a given year, we drop the second buyout making our sample unique on rm registration number and year.
Using the rm registration numbers we can identify employees aected by buyouts in the LISA database, available from Statistics Sweden.
12 The LISA database covers the population over 16 years of age in Sweden from 1990 to 2008 and links employees to employers. The yearly variables we gather from this database are age, sex, highest attained education level, the rm registration number for the individual's main source of income, establishment identier for the individual's main source of income, labor income, registered number of days in unemployment, and the establishment's industry code and municipality. For each buyout, if it was announced before the rst of November, we match that buyout with last year's employee information. If it was announced after the rst of November, we use this year's employee data to ensure tagging employees as treated before the buyout was announced.
Our analysis will be based on data for six years prior to the buyout to four years after the buyout. Since the LISA database contains information on individuals above the age of 16, we belongs to the 300 largest sponsors in the world by capital under management and the buyout rm is Swedish.
This gives a total of 73 unique exits. [...] Private equity sponsored exits were identied through the mergers and acquisition database Mergermarket. We do think there is a slight cause for concern about coverage in the Capital IQ database since it only picked up 46% of the transactions analyzed by Bergström et al. (2007) . drop all employees younger than 22 years to ensure that each individual has at least six years of data before being aected by a buyout. In the merge we lose 54 buyouts (we go from 255 to 201).
These are rm registration numbers which have no employees reporting that rm registration number as their main source of income. Out of our 201 buyouts, 25 are divestitures in the sense that we located the rm registration number not in the year the buyout is announced but one year later.
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The nal sample is summarized in Table I . We end up with 201 buyouts aecting 596 rm registration numbers, 1 904 establishments and 66 058 employees between 1998 and 2004.
14 The average buyout aects 329 employees in 2.97 rm registration numbers. The number of buyouts per year increases in over time. The sample of 201 buyouts for which we can identify employees corresponds well to the total sample of 255 buyouts in Sweden registered in Capital IQ database. Table II shows that average transaction values and the distribution of transaction types in our sample are similar to all transactions registered in Sweden. In both samples, corporate divestitures, cross border buyouts and management buyouts account for the bulk of all buyouts.
During 1998 to 2004, in terms of the number of buyout in the Capital IQ database, Sweden ranked ninth in the world, with 1.7% of all buyouts worldwide being undertaken in Sweden. The nal columns in Table II illustrate that buyouts in our sample do have smaller mean transaction value than in the U.S, but larger than those in the U.K and France. Sweden also has a lot of cross-border buyouts and corporate divestitures, but fewer management buyouts. 15 Employees in buyout targeted rms have on average higher yearly income and are more likely to be men; otherwise the samples correspond well to each other in terms of average age, average highest attained educational level (a seven degree scale from no education to having a PhD) and the geographical location of the establishment the employee works at.
13 These are likely newly formed rms as a result of a divestiture in connection with the buyout.
14 An establishment is dened as a geographical place of work. For example, a company with two stores at dierent locations has two establishments (one for each store).
15 We weight the random sample such that its yearly size corresponds to the yearly distribution of employees in targeted rms. 
Identication
To identify the eect of buyouts on employees, we use a dierence-in-dierence estimator coupled with population data on employees in Sweden. The dierence-in-dierence estimator compares the relative unemployment risk between employees in a treatment group and a control group over time, and allows us to control for unobserved time invariant group eects as well as common time eects. The model we base our estimates on is specied as
where Y igt is a dummy measuring whether employee i in group g was ocially registered as unemployed for at least one day at time t. 16 Time eects are represented by λ t and BO g is the treatment indicator taking on the value one if an employee is treated and zero otherwise. The interaction term, P ost t × BO g , takes the value one at the buyout year and all years after for the treated group and zero otherwise. Consequently, β captures the causal eect of the buyout on those employed at the targeted rm when the buyout was announced and represents a local average treatment eect.
To estimate Equation 1 we normalize time such that year zero is the year the buyout was announced. There is no consensus on how to compute the standard error for the dierencein-dierence estimator but a conservative approach is suggested by Donald and Lang (2007) .
They point out that the relevant variation for a dierence-in-dierence estimator is at the group level and not at the individual level. Estimation with group-time aggregated data is ecient and inference can be made under the assumption that the underlying common group errors are normally distributed. The assumption likely holds in our individual level analysis because our groups have both the same number of observations and a large and constant number of observations. Therefore, to account for possible intra-class correlation within time periods we aggregate our data to a group-time level and estimate the following model:
where
The variable P ost t indicates the year of the buyout and all years after, so β is the dierencein-dierence estimator. In the establishment and rm level analysis we fall back to reporting estimates using the disaggregated data because the number of observations in each group is smaller.
The construction of the control group is crucial for identication. For β to have a causal interpretation the treatment and the control group must have parallel trends in the absence of treatment. Then the trend of the control group serves as the counterfactual trend in unemploy-16 Our formal denition of unemployment risk is thus the share of employees in a group that has registered for receiving at least one day of unemployment benets this year. Robustness checks indicate that our results remain all the way up to dening the dummy as the employee at time t being registered as unemployed for at least 100 days. ment risk for the treatment group. Parallel trends in the absence of treatment is by denition unknown but is more likely to be fullled if the composition of the control group is similar to the composition of the treatment group. As pointed out by Card, Ibarraran, and Villa (2011), analyzing trends before treatment is the only way to examine the validity of the control group.
A similar pattern for the treatment and control group in the period before the treatment makes a common pattern after treatment more likely, because common shocks have previously aected the groups in similar ways. We are well positioned to examine trends before the buyout because we have six years of data before each buyout.
We use the universe of registered employees in Sweden each year to construct the control group. We create yearly cells based on individual sex; age in ten year intervals; skill level measured by a dummy taking the value one if the employee has at least two years of undergraduate studies; four regional locations of the establishment; 17 categories of industry classication of the establishment; a dummy taking the value one if the employee has been registered as unemployed at least one time during the last three years; rm size quartiles one year prior to the buyout; a growth dummy taking the value one if the rm has positive employment growth during the last two years prior to the buyout; and ve quantiles of average labor income over three years prior to the buyout.
17 If the number of control observations within a cell exceeds the number of treated observations, we randomly drop controls to have a perfectly balanced sample within each cell. If an employee is treated multiple times, we only include the employee as treated the rst time he or she is treated.
The matching process leaves us with 65 395 treated employees paired with 65 395 controls.
We lose 664 treated employees for which we fail to nd a match. Table IV presents summary statistics for the quality of the match. The groups balance well: we have performed a normalized t-test for dierence in means nding no statistically signicantly dierence.
18 Employees in our sample are on average 40 years of age at the time of the buyout, 21% have at least two years of undergraduate studies and thereby classied as high skilled, 42% are women, 44% were employed in the same rm three years prior to the buyout and 67% are employed in a rm that has had positive employment growth during the last two years. The employees were employed in rms with on average 116 employees.
19 The average yearly labor income is 260 423 SEK in the treatment group and 255 725 SEK in the control group. We fail to match employees with a history of unemployment and with more days in unemployment. The unmatched sample consist of on average older, more skilled employees with lower tenure and higher share with at least one day of registered unemployment during the last three years and total days in unemployment. A dierence between the matched and unmatched sample is not a problem because the unmatched sample consists of less than 1% of all treated employees.
17 An alternative matching procedure would have been to use propensity score matching. We chose not to go this route since we have such a large pool of employees to select controls from that we have no problems nding cell matches even when we use all the demographic information. A drawback of using propensity score matching is that the procedure relies on a correctly specied model for estimating the propensity score and a careful choice of matching algorithm. Using matching is simpler and more transparent.
18 Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) suggests that if the normalized dierence is less than a quarter, one need not worry about the model specication when using linear methods.
19 Measured per rm registration number. The average buyout still aects 329 employees, because a buyout aects on average 2.97 rm registration numbers. 
Analysis
Armed with data and an estimation technique, we start with estimating the eects on employees' unemployment risk. For comparison with studies on the eects of buyouts on employment in other countries, we then turn to estimating the eects on establishment and rm level employment growth.
Eects on Employees
Unemployment risk. We start out by graphically analyzing unemployment risk around the time of the buyout. All individuals in our sample are employed at the buyout year so we expect a mean reversion pattern with a declining unemployment risk before treatment and an increasing risk after treatment. The left part of Figure I plots unemployment risk in a given year in the treatment and control group from six years prior to treatment to four years after.
The right part of Figure I displays yearly dierences between the treated and control group with condence intervals showing whether the dierence is statistically dierent at the 5% level in comparison with the dierence at t − 6. We use a critical value for the condence intervals based on 11 degrees of freedom since we have 11 years of variation.
Because all employees are employed at the buyout year, a mean reversion pattern clearly shows up in the left gure. Unemployment risk decreases up until t = 0 and then starts to increase.
20 Trends in unemployment risk before treatment are similar for treated and control 20 At t = 0, the unemployment risk is non-zero as some employees are employed in at the rst of November but have been unemployed prior or after that. The mean reversion pattern can be compared to the Ashenfelter dip in the unemployment literature. A potential problem with a mean reverting pattern is that it occurs even employees indicating that our estimates can be interpreted as causal. The right gure shows that the eect is strongest for the rst two years and weakens slightly thereafter. Since we follow employees independently of whether they stay with the rm or not, a weakening of the treatment eect over time is not surprising as fewer employees remain with the treated rm.
The rst row in Table V The eect is not concentrated to specic rm size quartiles or quartiles of the labor income distribution.
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Labor income. An alternative way to examine how buyouts aect employees is to study labor income. Because labor income is the result of a combination of wage and labor supply, a lower unemployment risk should translate into higher income in comparison to the control group. Figure II is equivalent to Figure I but plots labor income instead of unemployment risk.
Again, the treatment and the control group have similar trends in average labor income before treatment. The increase in labor income before treatment reects the requirement that both treated and control individuals must be employed at time zero. The dierence-in-dierence estimate reported in the second row of Table V reveals that labor income increases by 3734 SEK which converts to a 1.4% increase, on average, for four years after the buyout. The labor income increase is not driven by a specic quartile in the labor income distribution.
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The higher labor income is it not entirely driven by shifts to unemployment. We know that the probability of becoming unemployed after the buyout is reduced, so we expect that a larger if a buyout has no eect on employees. Only by careful matching to nd a control group experiencing a similar dip can the eect of the dip be minimized.
21 See the online appendix for details.
22 See the online appendix for details. share of individuals in the treatment group remain with their rm, relative individuals in the control group. Because the control group will have a higher share of unemployed individuals, the dierence-in-dierence estimate conditional on the employee remain with the treated rm can be seen as a lower bound on the eect of the buyout on labor income alone. Conditioning on being employed for the four years following a buyout, the dierence-in-dierence estimate is 2 991 SEK (or 1.1%) and it is statistically signicant at the 1% level. Because we estimate a positive eect, the labor income eect in our main specication is not likely to be driven entirely by shifts to unemployment.
Strategic acquisitions. Even though we use rich demographic information in constructing the control group, there could still be unobservable time invariant characteristics making a rm a likely buyout target. If these unobserved rm characteristics correlate with idiosyncratic unemployment risk, we could falsely attribute the estimated eect on unemployment risk to buyouts rather than to selection. Given that we estimate a reduction in unemployment risk, a particular concern is that our matching procedure fails to capture that buyouts take place in rms that are positioned well to grow and thereby layos will be less likely.
The best way for us to deal with potential selection on unobservables is to use a dierent control group. If there are unobserved rm level characteristics that make a rm a particularly attractive target, our control group should be based on employees from potential or realized acquisition targets. We thus perform a robustness check by restricting the sample of possible control employees to employees in rms that were acquired by another rm in the same year as the buyout took place. We refer to these acquisitions as strategic acquisitions (as opposed to the nancially motivated acquisitions undertaken by private equity rms).
To create the pool of potential control employees, we use the IFN Corporate Database to Notes. This table displays dierence-in-dierence estimates for our staggered treatment approach using treated employees in other buyout years as controls for treated employees in a given buyout year. Columns (2), (3) and (4) present estimates accounting for industry-year specic trends, year-skill specic trends and tenure year specic trends. Standard errors clustered on buyout rm. Statistical signicance at the 5% and 1% level is denoted by * and **. Standard deviations are given in parenthesis.
identify all rms that were acquired between 1998 and 2004 in Sweden.
23 We correct for the ownership structure by tagging rms as being a part of a merger or acquisition if, for a given year, they are directly or indirectly majority owned by a rm acquired in that year. We select controls from employees in these rms by applying the same matching procedure as for our baseline sample.
The second row of Table V displays the results from estimating Equation 2 on the aggregated data using the newly created treated and control group. The point estimate is a statistically signicant and reveals a 0.6 percentage point decline in unemployment risk corresponding to a 7.9% reduction in unemployment risk. Though the result is slightly weaker, it gives us condence that unobservable characteristics making a rm a particularly good acquisition target play a minor role. The result also suggests that strategic acquisitions do not aect employees in the same way as buyouts do: buyouts reduce unemployment risk to a greater degree.
Staggered treatment. Another way of dealing with potential selection on unobservables is to make use of the staggered treatment dates in our sample. The dierent treatment dates allow us to construct a control group within the group of aected employees along the lines of Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999) and Arai and Skogman-Thoursie (2009) . That is, for a given year t, the control group consists of employees who are treated in earlier or later years. We estimate the following model using information for six years prior to each buyout and four years after each buyout:
where Y it measures whether employee i was registered for unemployment for at least one day during year t. Time constant employee heterogeneity is controlled for through employee xed eects α i , while θ t captures all common time eects that inuence unemployment risk. The variable Deal it is a dummy taking the value one if an employee is treated at time t or later. The eect on unemployment risk or labor income is identied by β. The identifying assumption is, as before, that the groups have parallel trends in absence of a buyout. Since the staggered treatment dates do not allow us to use time-aggregated data to take group specic shocks into account, the standard errors are clustered at the rm registration number level for the buyout year. Unobservable characteristics within the group of treated employees are more likely to be similar, which mitigates any potential unsolved selection problems.
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Results are presented in Table VI . With our staggered treatment approach, the unemployment risk after a buyout decreases. The basic model (column one in Table VI) , estimates the eect on unemployment risk to be -2.5 percentage points. Accounting for industry-year specic trends, year-skill specic trends and tenure year specic trends (columns two to four), the eect varies from -1.9 to -2.4 percentage points.
25 Because we still estimate statistically signicant reductions in unemployment risk, it is not likely that our initial approach suered from a severe selection problem.
Eects on Establishments and Firms
Continuing establishments. Having established statistically signicant declines in unemployment risk for employees, we now turn our attention to what goes on at the establishment and rm level to compare to studies from other countries. We start by examining employment growth in continuing establishments, that is, we look at establishments existing at the time the buyout was announced. As with the individual level analysis, we use a dierence-in-dierence methodology with cell matching. Following Davis et al. (2011) , we measure employment growth at time t for a group as the net change in employment at the group level dened as
where E it is number of employees at establishment i at time t. Weighting with the sum of the average rm sizes ensures that a group's employment growth rate is not driven by higher variance in employment growth in small rms.
Going from individual data to establishment data is trivial for the treatment group as we can simply use the establishments the treated employees were employed in. To create the control group, we match each treated establishment with an establishment that has not undergone a buyout using matching on a 17 category industry code; geographical location (four regions);
deciles of rm size of the rm the establishment belongs to; deciles of the three year average size of the establishment; whether the average educational level at the establishment is at least two years of undergraduate studies; whether the rm that the establishment belongs to has had a positive employment growth over the last two years; and whether the rm is a multiestablishment rm or not.
To improve the accuracy of the match, we initially restrict the pool of potential control establishments to those employing fewer employees than 1.25 times the largest establishment in 24 An alternative way of constructing a control group within the group of aected employees is to only use employees who are aected later as controls for employees subject to a buyout (thus omitting already treated employees from the control group). We do not use this approach because it reduces the usable sample size.
25 The results are unchanged using rm xed eects. the treated group. We start out with a sample of 1 904 treated establishments that are directly or indirectly majority owned by a rm targeted for a buyout. We focus on establishments that are stable in the sense that they have been active for at least two years before the buyout was announced. After the match, we are left with 1 376 treated establishment and 1 376 controls.
We are unable to nd a match for 92 establishments and we lose 436 establishments because they are not present for two periods before the buyout was announced.
Table VII displays summary statistics for the matched data at the time the buyout was announced (at t = 0). The control group is on average identical or similar to the treatment group in terms of average education level, share of establishments in a multi-establishment rm and the average size of the establishment. We fail to create balance in rm size: the average rm size is 143 employees in the treatment group and 324 employees in the control group. We have performed a normalized t-test of dierence in means between the treated and control group and all dierences are statistically insignicant from each other except for rm size. If we compare the matched sample of establishments with the sample of treated establishment of which we fail to match, we see that the unmatched sample almost exclusively consists of establishments belonging to rms with more than one establishment (a multi-establishment rm) and that failed matches tend to employ high skill employees to a greater extent.
We start by examining how the sample of treated and control establishments evolve over time. The left panel of Figure III displays the cumulative share of establishments in each group that, for a given year, are present in the next year. The survival rates for treated and control Notes. This gure displays the survival probability for an establishment (left) and the net employment growth change for the treated and control groups over time (right).
establishments are stable and around 80% of all establishments that were present at time zero are still active four years later. The similar survival rates suggests that treated establishments are no more likely to be shutdown than control establishments. The similar survival rates also make our results more robust to possible compositional changes in the treatment and the control group.
The right part of Figure III Davis et al. (2011) . Both studies apply the same measure for employment growth but Davis et al. (2011) analyzes buyouts during a period from 1980 to 2000 and has a data set covering more than 150 000 establishments in the US. Even though the US sample contains more buyouts over a longer period, the average change in employment growth is similar: the eect on the cumulative employment growth rate four years after the buyout is -6.0 percentage points in Sweden and -5.4 percentage points in the US. However, Davis et al. (2011) report that targeted establishments in the US are more likely to be shut down than control establishments, which we do not observe in Sweden.
Our individual level data allows us to go further than Davis et al. (2011) by decomposing changes in employment growth at the establishment level into hirings and separations. Our estimation is based on the following model: (Table 3 in Davis et al. (2011) ).
where Y igt takes on dierent forms. For each year we track all employees at an establishment one year back and one year forward. To estimate the overall eect on hirings, Y igt is a dummy taking on the value one if an employee is hired during a given year. To measure the eect on separations, Y igt is dened as a dummy taking on the value one if an employee is doing his or her last year at an establishment given that the establishment is observed in data in the following year.
When we use aggregated data and the model represented by Equation 2, we nd that the overall drop in hiring following a buyout is 4.1 percentage points and statistically signicant (with a standard error of 0.009) while the estimate for separations is not signicant (point estimate of -1.3 percentage points with a standard error of 0.009). Hence, reduced employment growth at the establishment level is due to hiring freezes rather than to increased separations.
Firm level employment growth. Moving up to the rm level, we start by examining net employment growth for group-adjusted rms consisting of the rm within an ownership group that was directly targeted by a private equity rm and its subsidiaries. Tracking rms over time is substantially more dicult than tracking individuals or establishments as rm registration numbers and group structures change frequently. A benet of our data is that we can adjust for the group structure year by year and thereby can track acquisitions, divestitures, shutdowns and the creation of new divisions more accurately. However, we are still unable to correct for ownership structures that puts the targeted rm itself as a subsidiary; adjusting upwards risks that we aggregate up to the private equity fund level and thus include other portfolio rms as part of the treated rm. Because of the diculty of accurately tracking rms over time, we restrict our analysis to two years before and after the buyout. Matching these buyouts well is hard because of considerable variation in how corporate groups are structured and at what levels within the group subsidiaries are placed.
We follow the same procedure as in the establishment level analysis for calculating employment growth for the dierent groups over time.
26 Figure IV reveals that both groups show fairly similar trends in employment growth change before the buyout was announced. Figure   26 Because we adjust for the group structure we end up with a few cases in which our growth measure at the rm level is close to 2 (the maximum value) as a result of the size of the rm growing by over 1000%. The high growth likely captures a misallocation of a subsidiary within a group (as a result of, for example, changing the rm registration number for administrative reasons). Since we weight each observation by the number of employees, our group aggregated measure gives a large weight to these incorrect observations. To deal with this, we drop 44 observations for which the growth from one year to the next is above 1.9 and in which the resulting rm size size is over 1000 employees. IV also reveals no dierence in employment growth change after the buyout. As shown by the right graph, there are no large dierences between the treated and control group of rms in terms of survival rate after the buyout. Estimating Equation 1 using disaggregated data, the dierence-in-dierence estimate for employment growth is not statistically dierent from zero.
A central part of Davis et al. (2011) is showing that private equity rms seem to speed up the creative destruction process by closing down more establishments and opening up more new ones compared to their control group. As the establishment level analysis showed, an important dierence between the US and Sweden is that we do not observe a greater degree of establishment shutdowns after the buyout. That there is no change in shutdowns is also evident from Table X, which presents descriptive statistics on the share of establishments shutdown, acquired created or divested between the buyout year and two years after. The only type of reorganization that seems to occur to a greater degree for treated rms is divestments of establishments. Neither greeneld creation nor new acquisitions of establishments are more common in treated rms relative control rms.
27 In sum, evidence of private equity rms speeding up the creative destruction process in Sweden is weaker than evidence from the US.
Interpreting the Results
We now turn to possible mechanisms that could explain a reduced unemployment risk for employees. Two interpretations strike us as probable. The rst one draws on the theoretical background provided in Section 2: employees benet because of relaxed nancial constraints at the rm level.
The second interpretation draws on the the argument that labor market regulations in Sweden restrict private equity rms from ring employees.
27 A greeneld is identied in the data as a new establishment not present earlier. An acquisition is dened as an establishment existing before joining a rm. Notes. At t + 2 refers to a sample of establishments that were all present at t + 2 where Remaining is the share of establishments that also were present at t, Greeneld is the share of newly started establishments and Acquired is the share of establishments that were not connected to a target rm at time t but were acquired later. From t to t + 2 refers to what had happened in t + 2 to the sample of establishments that were all present in t, here Remaining refers to the share of establishments that were also present at t, Divested refers to the share of establishments that belonged to a target rm in t but not in t + 2, and Shut down is the share of establishment that belonged to a targeted rm in t but did not exist at t + 2.
Alleviating Financial Constraints
The nancial constraints story receives support in the data. We perform three tests. The rst relies on variation across industries in dependence of external capital needed for new investments.
To measure industry dependence of external capital we follow Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Boucly et al. (2011) and calculate the dierence between capital expenditure and gross cash ow divided by capital expenditures for all rms in a given industry and year. A high dependence of external capital to nance new investments is associated with a high ratio. We then take the average ratio for each industry over the whole period and dene all industries with a ratio above the median as dependent on external capital.
28 We estimate separate dierence-in-dierence estimators for employees in industries with high dependence and for employees in industries with low dependence. The rst two rows of Table XI display the result using the aggregated data. Consistent with the idea that a buyout relaxes nancial constraints, employees in nancially dependent industries are estimated to have a reduced unemployment risk of, on average, 1.6 percentage points in the post four-year period in contrast to employees in non-nancially dependent industries for which we nd no eect of the buyout on unemployment risk.
The second test is based on comparing divisional buyouts to other types of buyouts. Corporate divestitures involve taking parts of a larger rm out as a separate entity, so the parts bought out are less likely to be nancially constrained prior to the buyout, due to internal capital markets. To investigate, we estimate a dierence-in-dierence model on aggregated data in accordance with Equation 2 where treatment is dened as being part of a corporate divestiture and control dened as being part of a non-corporate divestiture. The dierence-in-dierence estimate, row three in Table XI , shows a 1.8 percentage points or a 24% higher unemployment 28 The main two industries classied as dependent on external capital are the manufacturing industry and the transport, storage and communication industry. These account for over 95% of the treated employees in all industries with a nancial dependence ratio above the median. A relative decrease in unemployment risk for non-corporate divestitures is consistent with unemployment risk decreasing because of relaxed nancial constraints.
The third test relies on studying how the eects on employees vary across the business cycle.
If a buyout relaxes nancial constraints, it should make rms more likely to be able to withstand negative economic shocks because of easier access to capital injections from the private equity 
Labor Market Regulations
While the nancial constraints story is consistent with the data, we fail to nd evidence that labor market regulations restrict private equity rms from laying o employees. We undertake three tests based on variation in employment protection across employees. The idea is that if labor market regulations are indeed an obstacle for private equity rms, they would seek to avoid them by concentrating layos to employees with weaker protections.
The rst test is based on that employment protections in Sweden are increasing with tenure due to a rst-in-last-out seniority rule. We can thus compare the eect of the buyout on employees with shorter tenure to those with longer tenure in the rm. We estimate Equation 2 using aggregated data separately for employees with three or more years of tenure at their place of work and for employees with less than two years of tenure. The rst two rows of Notes. Statistical signicance at the 5% and 1% level is denoted by * and **.
Table XII present our estimates. For both samples we nd a statistically signicant decrease in unemployment risk, and the eect is slightly stronger for employees with shorter tenure.
The second test is based on variation in employment protection in Sweden that stems from the fact that employees on temporary contracts are protected less by laws than those on permanent contracts. Though we do not observe the types of employment contracts employees have, employees on temporary contracts are more likely to jump in and out of unemployment.
Employees with unemployment days in the years prior to the buyout are then more likely to be on a temporary contract than employees that have not been unemployed prior to the buyout.
The middle two rows of Table XII display the results of estimating Equation 2 using aggregated data for employees with at least one day of unemployment during the period t − 2 to t and those that had no unemployment during the same period. We only estimate statistically signicant declines in unemployment risk for employees with an unemployment history, suggesting that the buyout benets employees with weaker employment protections to a greater extent.
As a third test for whether employment protection is important for how buyouts aect employees, we estimate separate eects for young and old employees. OECD reports that 41.3%
of employees between 15 and 24 years old had temporary contracts in 2000 (OECD, 2002) . The same gure for the group of employees aged 25 to 54 was 10.5%. The relative softer protection for younger individuals should make them more sensitive to cost cutting through downsizing of the workforce. We divide our sample into employees older and younger than 30 years when the buyout was announced. The last two rows of Table XII show estimates from using aggregated data. Most of the reduction in unemployment risk can be attributed to younger employees.
In sum, these tests suggest that labor market regulations do not restrict private equity 
Conclusion
Using data from Sweden, we show that employees benet from buyouts by experiencing a reduction in unemployment risk and an increase in labor income. These benets pertain to employees across most quartiles of the labor income distribution. Moving up from the individual level to the establishment and the rm level, we show that the eect on rm and establishment level employment growth is surprisingly similar to those observed in the US and the UK. The reduction in unemployment risk is mostly concentrated to industries dependent on external capital to grow, non-divisional buyouts in which the target rm is more likely to be nancially constrained, and buyouts undertaken just prior to the economic slowdown following the IT stock market crash in 2001. We nd no evidence that labor market regulations restrict private equity rms from laying o employees. These ndings are consistent with the hypothesis that the potenital negative eects of buyouts on employees, from cost cutting and higher debt load, are outweighed by the positive eects of relaxing nancial constraints at the rm level.
Given these ndings, concerns that private equity rms operating in Sweden have generated returns for investors at the expense of employees are unwarranted. Our analysis also suggests that caution should be exercised in interpreting declines in rm and establishment level employment growth observed in the UK and the US as detrimental to individual employees. Moreover, the connection between unemployment risk and access to capital we establish suggests more generally that policies designed to relax rms' nancial constraints could trickle down to benet individual employees by reducing transitions to unemployment.
